















The Public Sphere and the Political Sphere: Rhetorical Interconnections 
 




Mythos is the name for the foggy beliefs, often accompanied by narratives, from which 
power is built.  They exist in cultural memory, but work is going on at all times to reinforce them, 
to alter them, because from mythic work shifts of power take place.  From the perspective of 
communication, myth is important because it manipulates the taken-for-granted.  What we call 
"issues" can be voiced only when the stuff from which they are constructed emerges from the 
taken-for-granted and enters the realm of contingency and questioning, from whence evolves 
discussion.  There is a power of sublimation in myth, a power to silence discussion, and with that 
silencing to smoother the possibility of change.  Indeed, it is this power that makes myth so 
important to maintaining political power. 
But myth also structures the issues that guide scholars and theorists of politics and 
communication.  Possibilities for change emerge when mythic powers can be illuminated,  and in 
the illumination, removed from the taken-for-granted.  To critics of politics such illumination is 
crucial to evolving our understanding of how politics functions, and we must be always on the 
alert for myths that sublimate our understandings. 
My objective today is to open what I consider a crucial space in the operations of politics. 
 
I do so to point the way to important work for rhetorical critics in a time when the viability of 

















Let me begin at the heart of the matter with a distinction between the public and the 
political sphere. I depend a great deal here on the work of Jiirgen Habermas.  Habermas is, by  
now, famous for his notion of the public sphere. But in early formulation of that notion, Habermas 
makes an important distinction that is often ignored.  Even I ignored this distinction until one of 
our graduate students, Paul Stewart, insisted that I confront it. And Habermas himself ignores it in 
some of his later work, confounding descriptions of communication in the political sphere with 
theoretical prescriptions in the public. 
 
Habermas' argument for his conception begins in the coffee houses of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Europe.  Students of rhetoric in the Scottish enlightenment will recall the Red 
Lion Inn in Aberdeen as such a venue.  Habermas argues that in these venues the bourgeois class  
of Europe began to discuss public affairs. What was meant by public was a notion of socialized 
interest. Europe was undergoing a major reorientation in its thinking about social relationships. 
The loss of power by the church had opened a different geography of power.  No longer was that 
geography vertical - all humans located in terms of those that lay above and those that lay below, 
with the top of the hierarchy in heaven.  Rather, a horizontal geography was being invented, built 
around the concept "society." From this theoretical flowering came the great works that we study 
today as the basis of democracy, including Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes. 
Emerging at the same time was the theoretical notion of the "individual" -the assertion that the 
human personality could be constructed as the central centripetal force in motivation.  Thus, 











a place where the line between these two -today best understood as the line between the private 
and the public - could be located and the grounds of public action delineated. 
Two other elements in our story were emergent at the same time.  First, democracy - the 
notion of government of the people, by the people, and for the people - was emerging.  Both 
individualism and society were necessary for democracy to develop, and Europe was reclaiming 
the Greek experience from its cultural memory to reformulate the notion for the late second 
millennium.  Second, the nation-state was emerging - a power move by certain European princes 
that took advantage of the notions of society to centralize their own power on a basis other than 
their divine right to rule ordained by God. What was happening here was a mythic transformation 
- from the myth of divine anointment of power, to the myth of the ruler as an expression of 
society. 
Of course, the rulers of this first wave -the princes who claimed national identity - were 
not democrats. They simply sought to establish their own power over other princes by reversion to 
an alternative myth. But in this era of tentative power, the seeds of the prince's troubles were also 
emerging. Princes pontificated that their voice was the expression of society, but wise princes 
knew that they were giving up power even as they were claiming it, that danger lurked in their 
straying too far from society's understandings of itself. The result was the emergence of a key 
concept for us - social legitimacy. 
As the power of the bourgeois threatened the princes, Habermas argues, a new rationality 
became necessary for government.  As leaders grounded legitimacy in the public will, pontification 
-the declaration that their voice was the public will - gave way to a justificatory communication 
 












enters - public opinion. Habermas posits that it was in the coffee houses of Europe that the milieu 
of communication first developed that provided legitimacy for government action. It is this 
discourse which Habermas identifies as the public sphere.  Once princes had adopted legitimacy in 
public opinion, other arrangements -either constitutional monarchies or electoral democracies 
were sure to follow. Either were based in the theoretical framework for late second millennium 
democracies. 
Let me then, pause to draw some distinctions from our story so far. First, note that there is 
a difference here between the government and the public sphere.  Second, notice that there is 
characteristic communication in each - a communication of discussion in the public sphere and a 
communication of pontification followed by justification in the governmental.  Third, at stake in 
the relationship between the two spheres is the legitimacy of the actions of the government. 
Our theoretical attention now turns to how to relate these two spheres of communication to 
each other.  The legitimate power of a government rested in its ability to develop a justificatory 
rhetoric grounded in the communication of the public sphere.  But the public sphere was not 
isolated from the governmental sphere. In fact, the two spheres operated with a kind of dialectical 
relationship between them.  Governmental leaders could use their voice to seek to enter the 
discourse of the public sphere. But when they did so, they were wise to also hear the voice of the 
public sphere. What this means we will get to later. 
Mythos also developed to cement the power of rulers in democracy. Early rulers learned 
that declarations that "What the people want is . . ." would be a strategy that would enhance their 
power.  In short, governments developed a mythos that identified them as the expression of the 











purported to represent public opinion - to be the party of the people.  Then, elections developed as 
rituals to bestow legitimacy on actions for a specified period of time.  In the early twentieth 
century mass communication developed and purported to be "the voice of the people."  In the late 
twentieth century, opinion polling developed as a method of structuring public opinion.  I have 
explored the current myths in an earlier essay, "On Statist Rhetoric." 
By the late twentieth century, Habermas was prepared to talk about a legitimation crisis in 
western democracies.  Actually, of course, the legitimation crisis was general to western and 
communist democracies.  The mythos that legitimated the power of the regimes had worn thin. 




At this point, let me abandon the narrative and simply develop concepts that we need to 
discuss this relationship between the public and the political sphere.  There has been a general 
theoretical confusion created by the failure to draw the distinction that Habermas draws between 
the public and the governmental sphere.  Let me sort out the two spheres.  First the public sphere. 
The first thing to be said, and emphatically, is that the public sphere is the domain of those whose 
public life lies beyond the arena of institutions.  These are the folks who sort through the 
relationship between the private and the public – that is, what things are my own concern and my 
own responsibility and what things should we address together as fellow humans in society.  This 
fundamental issue is the primal stuff of the conversations that compose the public sphere. 
A second important characteristic is the informality of its communication.  To be sure, 
formal platform speeches can be given in the public sphere, but they most often function as what 







informality, the discourse of the public sphere is also perishable which makes the task of 
engagement by rhetorical critics difficult.  But more on that later. 
Sociologist C. Wright Mills has provided additional description of communication in the 
public sphere. It is a place, he argues, where one has as much chance of being a sender as one does 
of being a receiver of messages - that is, it is a sphere ofrelative democratic equality. Mills also 
observes that in the public sphere actions are more directly connected with communication, but I 
think he is only partially right about this. Certainly, the public sphere acts in a million ways every 
day. But in a way I will explain shortly, it is not only the domain of action, but also the domain 
that provides the grounds of action in the political sphere. Rhetorically, the public sphere is not 
primarily a deliberative place.  Rather, it is marked far more by Aristotle's genres of epideictic and 
forensic.  The communication of the public sphere celebrates.  It is permeated with judgement. 
Finally, we must highlight the seeming chaos of the public sphere.  The public sphere is a 
great buzzing, diverse, unfocused, polyvalent, diffused carnival of chatter.  Order is emergent from 
it, not its characteristic.  It is (and this is a key point) singular and incredibly multiplicitous at the 
same time.  There is not one public sphere, there are many, yet when the impact of the public 
sphere is felt, these multiplicitous spheres are one.  This paradox is one of the key elements of the 
relationship between the public and the political. 
As I turn to the political sphere, it is a good time to discuss terminology.  Ina society, at 
any time, a number of institutions compete for power: the church, government, commerce, and the 











the bargain that established the axis of the public and governmental spheres.  This bargain granted 
the governmental sphere power as the expression of public opinion in exchange for government's 
attentiveness to the public sphere as the source of its legitimacy.  Since that bargain was struck, 
other institutions including the church and commerce have struggled to displace government's 
powers.  To this point they have failed, although a topic for another day is whether commerce now 
has the strategy to make that overthrow.  I point to this struggle to comment that the political  
sphere and the governmental sphere coincide in the mythos of modern democracy, but are distinct 
and potentially divergent.  The point is important because in the seam between the public and the 
political -the arena of legitimacy - lies the bargain that is the basis of democratic governmental 
power and thus an essential element of its continued ascendancy. 
The political or governmental sphere (I will use the terms interchangeably having now 
warned you of the myth in that usage) is the arena that we are most familiar with as students of 
political communication.  It is American politics: campaigning, issues, legislative hearings, 
congressional debate, accusation, oversight, regulation, and all the accouterments.  This is the  
realm of persuasion, sound bites, argument.  Although it also has the quality of a din, we can aspire 
to grasp it as students of communication, even as we miss some of it.  Our rhetorical theory is 
based here.  There is a degree of formality structured around documents such as the Constitution 
and Roberts Rules of Order that govern the rules by which the communication proceeds.  l won't 
spend a lot of time describing the political sphere because you are very familiar with it, even if you 
may have thought of it, incorrectly in my view, as the public sphere. 
III. 
 











the political sphere on the public.  This is not exactly a new observation in rhetorical theory.  It is 
the basis of Aristotle's discussion of the need to base praise in Sythia on the Sythian virtues  We 
teach it in Fundamentals of Public Speaking as analysis of the audience.  Thomas Farrell has 
written about it as "social knowledge."  Karl Wallace, and Walter Fisher after him, have called it 
"good reasons."  Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca have called it the "starting points of 
argument."  My theoretical contribution today is to locate the source of that general cultural 
reference in a place where it can change and develop in its own process of communication -the 
public sphere.  That is, the political sphere, under the mythos of democratic government, must 
understand, penetrate, and ground in a changing, evolving public sphere. 
Now, let me clarify some terms to help us operate between these two spheres.  And lets 
begin with "legitimacy."   As political theory tells us, legitimacy is a sense of being right.  It is 
important to those in power because it allows the exercise of authority without resort to violence 
and coercion.  Forms of governing that revert to compulsion and abandon their legitimacy will 
ultimately fail because they consume the very resources that they depend upon.  Communication is 
the place where actions are contextualized into values, motives, good reasons, to bathe in 
legitimacy.  Values, motives, and good reasons are the touchpoints of the relationship between the 
political and public spheres.  It is here they must be congruent, or the political sphere must reach 
into the public and seek change.  The changes take place in the public sphere. 
A second key term is "political leadership." The concept recognizes that the political 
sphere exercises influence over the public. I will not pretend that we fully understand leadership - 
like legitimacy I will take it as a problem for rhetorical study. But it is a useful concept to focus on 












reaching into the public sphere. 
 
A third key concept is "public opinion."  Habermas is correct to focus on this term as an 
evolving mythic construct that has been used to shift realms of power.  The political sphere has 
sought to free itself to a degree from the public sphere in the 20th century by using a materialized, 
quantitative construct of public opinion to argue for its legitimacy.  Michael Hogan has admirably 
described this power move.  Susan Herbst has described the underlying myth.  Conceptually, 
public opinion is the construction of the values, motives, and good reasons of the public sphere 
used in the construction of justificatory discourse in the political sphere.  You must think of it as a 
construction rather than as a "fact" to understand the anxieties and limitations that mark discourse 
in the political sphere. 
I mentioned three concepts earlier that we would be well to define for a moment.  "Values" 
require some rethinking.  In fact, I would prefer that you use the verb "valuing" to the noun 
"values."  One of the ways in which the political sphere has materialized the public sphere is by 
commodifying  "values," that is, thinking of them as things that can be manifested, bought, sold, 
handed down, inherited, weighed, exchanged, and the other actions that our metaphors of 
commerce permit.  Values are better seen as the extra-factual and extra-material elements brought  
to juding the events of life.  I have mentioned that much of the discourse of the public sphere is 
judgmental.  It is this discourse where non-material values encounter the material world and the 
junction evolves both. 
"Motives" are used here in the symbolic interactionists' framework of justificatory 
discourse.  That is, the structure of motivation is discursive and, like values, motives mediate 










term, "good reasons."  They are acceptable reasons for an action grounded in our notions of right 
and wrong and our patterns of acceptance and rejection.  Speakers in the political sphere seek to 
motivate actions in the values and good reasons authorized in the public sphere. 
IV. 
 
Let me now, employ this theoretical understanding in some criticism, attempting to give 
you a glimpse of a dynamic public sphere with public opinion grounding political legitimacy. 
Please permit me to do what you will not let your undergraduate students do, talk about capital 
punishment.  The capital punishment controversy has been revisited over the recent past, reaching 
a sort of climax when Conservative Governor George Ryan of Illinois declared a moratorium on 
state-sponsored executions in late January 2000.  I want to examine this controversy at a macro 
level.  That is, I am interested in the texture of the controversy rather than specific persuasive 
messages.  Let me begin by examining the "good reasons" that have supported the growth in the 
death penalty in the last two decades.  If we examine the discourse in either the political or public 
spheres supporting the death penalty, there are four "good reasons" that have motivated the 
growth.  The first is Biblical - the principle of the Old Testament - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth, a death for a death.  The second is a kind of economic logic.  According to this explanation, 
criminals about to commit heinous acts calculate the costs of their acts and weigh them against the 
benefits.  Thus, to change the decision of criminals to kill, the costs of the act must be increased 
and the death penalty achieves that. 
Over the last twenty years, these two rather old rationales have been joined by two new 
motives for state-sponsored execution.  The first is a kind of therapeutic motive: being able to 














close. The general frame of this motive - the therapeutic frame of identifying victimage and 
seeking relief from it - has been an increasing pattern in American discourse during the last half of 
the 20tl' Century. Mike Cuffman is currently studying the interconnection of that frame to the 
discourse of the conservative commentator, Rev. James Dobson. The general power of the form 
has served the purposes of supporting the legitimacy of the death penalty through this "good 
reason" of healing the victim's family. 
The other recent development is a growing viewpoint on crime as a kind of war.  Police 
agencies increasingly receive quasi-military training.  Today, police appear in large numbers at 
points of tension such as protests against the World Trade Organization, dressed in military outfits 
complete with helmets, a sort of urban fatigues, and carrying military style weapons.  Recent 
legislation, particularly at the federal level, has attempted to provide military style technology to 
police units as part of the "war on crime."  The result has been an enemizing of the criminal.  In a 
rhetorical framework of the war metaphor, the criminal becomes an enemy, and the death of the 
criminal is lamented less because of his status as our enemy. 
These good reasons have begun to weaken, however.  Today, the legitimacy of capital 
punishment is eroding.  I am interested in considering some of the reasons for this erosion, 
particularly in the public sphere and now in the political as well.  And I think the reasons will 
guide us to developments in the public sphere. 
To be sure, there have been changed circumstances.  Most notably, there has been a 
marked decrease in crime over the last ten years. Tracing the causes of that decrease is another 
interesting rhetorical problem, but let it suffice to note that the decrease diminishes the urgency of 











But I also want to discuss the erosion of the power of the two new motives -the 
therapeutic and the war metaphor. Let me begin with the latter. War has become a very different 
thing since the end of the Cold War.  The geometry of modern war features the overwhelming 
power of the American military. Validated by the Gulf War, this "fact" has led to a military that is 
more involved in "peace missions" than in active fighting. Even when military actions are taken, 
such as the NATO war against Serbia, the final objective has been transformed into a peace 
mission. In short, war has lost much of its sting as a totalizing strategy to deal with problems. 
Nor do Americans see themselves as fighting wars anymore against a people.  Inthe last 
decade our wars have been with malignant leaders. There has been an increasing and 
countervailing emphasis on economic power and diplomacy as the keys to management of the 
world's problems.  All of this passage of war out of style for Americans has weakened the 
motivational power of the war metaphor on issues of crime.  The metaphoric nature of seeing the 
criminal as an enemy simply does not have for us what Walter Fisher has called narrative fidelity. 
I believe the weakening of the therapeutic motive have two sources.  First, conservative 
voices have led a charge against the therapeutic as an overdone "good reason."  Victimage has 
been exposed as a rhetorical strategy in the worst sense; and the art of becoming a victim by your 
choice, rather than your victimizer's choice, has become a theme of public discussion.  Far more 
important, however, is the dramatization of relatives of victims witnessing executions.  Against a 
backdrop of abhorrence at executions being public spectacles (unlike a hundred years ago, we now 
think that picnics in front of the gallows are distasteful) the media image of families declaring their 
satisfaction at the death of the killer of their loved one has taken on a kind of ghoulish quality. 












executed.  These are not pictures that the public necessarily embraces. 
 
The result has been a weakening of the power of the "good reasons" that drove the 
increased support for the death penalty since 1973. At the same time, many of the cases that have 
reached the level of public awareness have tested the limits of legitimacy.  The mythos that 
surrounds the criminal justice system and its ultimate penalty is <justice>.  The public sphere is 
filled with myths about justice and capital punishment has washed up against many of these. For 
the first time in a hundred years, Texas executed a women.  Arkansas executed a boy of 18 for a 
crime committed at age 15. Other cases feature the execution of the mentally impaired.  These 
cases become the grist for the public discussion of capital punishment, and they challenge ideas 
about the treatment of women, youth, and the mentally impaired in the legal system. 
But the growing opposition to the death penalty has been most energized by two old 
powerful American themes: race and technology.  The overwhelming face of execution in America 
is black. Reinforced by statistical evidence of the discrepancy between sentences for black and 
white criminals, the involvement of American racism in the death penalty has come to the surface. 
Even though, as Janet Reno indicated earlier this week, statistical correlation does not mean that 
justice is being distorted, the American embarrassment of racism makes race a potent motive for 
concern. 
The theme of technology is crossed with another old American theme: that our justice 
system is committed to freeing the innocent.  American's have always had a powerful romantic 
attachment to technology as the magic elixir that will solve all our problems.  The introduction of 
DNA technology into criminal investigation is the latest in a string of technological advances that 











Americans flock to such a possibility.  And, in enough cases to question our faith in the justice 
system, technology has indicated the innocence of people that we are about to execute. 
In sum, at the macro level, the diminishing power of the therapeutic and the war 
metaphor has been accompanied by the rhetorical dawning of race and technological screening to 
erode the legitimacy of capital punishment.  Following a series in the Chicago Tribune on the 
difficulties with the death penalty in Illinois, Governor Ryan declared that he no longer had faith 






What shall I conclude from this example about the power of opening the space between the 
public and political spheres for examination.  I should start by observing my discomfort with some 
aspects of this treatment.  Macro level research is difficult for a hard core believer in empirical 
evidence  (in the old sense of experience rather than the political myth of quantification).  I have 
tried to track some changes that I perceive in the diffuse public sphere.  As a critic, I have always 
been sensitive to the discourse of the public sphere.  I am a listener to an extreme as I travel in 
various circles. I am often a provocateur in conversations.  The informal character of the public 
sphere requires these skills and other methods besides, including more focus groups and 
ethnographic methods in rhetorical study.  We need to develop a sensitivity for discourse in the 
public sphere. 
1am also somewhat disappointed that I have not penetrated to a vocabulary that would 
actually allow me to capture communication doing the work of changing the public sphere.  I 










the linear logic of billiard-ball theories of change.  Changes in mythos are sea changes. Much 
more sophisticated models of the influence of communication will be necessary to discuss this 
change intelligently.  I was tempted to do an analysis for this paper of the effect of the television 
series West Wing on politics.  But I resisted the urge.  I want to read Trevor and Shawn's analysis 
first.  And I want to avoid overclaiming change paths from a single source. 
I am pleased with my effort, however, in utilizing the breach between the two spheres to 
show the evolution of the public sphere shaping the changes in the political. The example of 
capital punishment, in fact, is one where even today the public sphere is, I believe, ahead of the 
political. Although the movement against capital punishment is growing, it has not penetrated 
very far into the political sphere. I believe the distinction has encouraged me to examine cultural 
context for political discourse with a richer inquiry than if l were to merely think of the public as 
an audience for political discourse. 
And I am also pleased because I think the analysis shows how changes in values, motives, 
and good reasons in the public sphere work with great complexity.  They form the synapses that 
surface again and again in places beyond their obvious influence.  A reaffirmation of technology 
fueled by the computer age and genetic engineering changes the legitimacy of the death penalty.  A 
success of a conservative attack on their politics boomerangs to undercut the legitimacy of a 
Conservative litmus issue. 
I believe that my original argument - that the power of the public sphere would be realized 
only when a theory opened the gap between the public and the political - has been vindicated.  So 
much yet to do, but some satisfaction with that accomplished to this point. 
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